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Kit Pong Wong∗
School of Economics and Finance, University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the optimal production and hedging decisions of the multinational firm under
exchange rate uncertainty when the multinational firm possesses smooth ambiguity preferences.
Ambiguity is modeled by a second-order probability distribution that captures the multinational
firm’s uncertainty about which of the subjective beliefs govern the exchange rate risk. Ambiguity
preferences are modeled by the (second-order) expectation of a concave transformation of the (first-
order) expected utility of home currency profit conditional on each plausible subjective distribution
of the exchange rate risk. Within this framework, we show that the separation and full-hedging
theorems are robust to the incorporation of ambiguity and ambiguity preferences. The presence of
the currency hedging opportunity induces the multinational firm to produce more and sell less at
home, and export more abroad. When the forward exchange rate is biased, we derive necessary and
sufficient conditions under which the multinational firm optimally opts for a forward position that
is closer to a full-hedge in response to either the introduction of ambiguity or greater ambiguity
aversion.
JEL classification: D81; F23; F31
Keywords: Ambiguity; Ambiguity aversion; Currency hedging; Multinational firms
1. Introduction
Multinational firms take exchange rate risk management seriously. In an extensive sur-
vey of Fortune 500 firms, Jesswein et al. (1995) document the extent of knowledge and use
of exchange rate risk management products by these firms. They show that currency for-
ward contracts are the most popular hedging instruments that are adopted by 93.1 percent
of respondents of the survey. The next commonly used hedging instruments are foreign
currency swaps (52.6 percent) and over-the-counter currency options (48.8 percent). Re-
cent innovative exchange rate risk management products such as compound options (3.8
∗Tel.: +852 2859 1044; fax: +852 2548 1152.
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percent) and look-back options (5.1 percent) are among the least extensively used hedging
instruments. The Jesswein et al. (1995) survey suggests that most multinational firms meet
their exchange rate risk management needs by relying solely on currency forward contracts
that are not supplanted by more complicated innovations.1
The study of the multinational firm under exchange rate uncertainty has been the sub-
ject of considerable research in decision making under uncertainty (Broll, 1992; Broll and
Zilcha, 1992; Choe et al., 2015; Katz and Paroush, 1979; Kawai and Zilcha, 1986; Lien and
Wong, 2005; Meng and Wong, 2007; Viaene and Zilcha, 1998; Wong, 2012, 2013). The
extant literature assumes that the multinational firm’s preferences admit the standard von
Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility representation. When the multinational firm has
access to a forward market for currency hedging purposes, two celebrated results emanate.
First, the separation theorem states that the multinational firm’s production and export
decisions depend neither on the risk attitude of the multinational firm, nor on the incidence
of the exchange rate uncertainty. Second, the full-hedging theorem states that the multi-
national firm fully hedges against its risk exposure to the exchange rate uncertainty should
the forward market be unbiased.
In reality, multinational firms may not be able to unambiguously assign a probability
distribution that uniquely describes the exchange rate risk. To this end, we define uncer-
tainty in the sense of Knight (1921) to be made up of two components, risk and ambiguity.2
Risk aversion is the aversion to a set of outcomes with a known probability distribution.
Ambiguity aversion is the additional aversion to being unsure about the probabilities of
outcomes. Dated back to the Ellsberg’s (1961) paradox, ambiguity has been alluded to the
violation of the independence axiom, which is responsible for the decision criterion being
1In a survey conducted by the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, 83 percent of large
firms hedge against commodity, currency, and interest rate risk, whereas only 45 percent of medium firms
and 12 percent of small firms do so. Multinational firms are clearly in the category of large firms. See
Bodnar et al. (1998).
2Knight (1921) points out that ambiguity is fundamentally different from risk. Specifically, risk relates
to objective uncertainty, where outcome probabilities are known or can be estimated with confidence. In
contrast, ambiguity relates to subjective uncertainty, where outcome probabilities are unknown, and decision
makers are not sure which estimated models are correct.
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linear in the outcome probabilities.3 The distinction between the known-unknown and the
unknown-unknown is relevant since individuals appear to prefer gambles with known rather
than unknown probabilities. Indeed, ample experiments (Chow and Sarin, 2001; Einhorn
and Hogarth, 1986; Sarin and Weber, 1993) and surveys of business owners and managers
(Chesson and Viscusi, 2003; Viscusi and Chesson, 1999) have documented convincing evi-
dence that ambiguity aversion prevails.
Klibanoff et al. (2005) have recently developed a powerful decision criterion known as
“smooth ambiguity aversion” that is compatible with ambiguity averse preferences under
uncertainty (hereafter referred to as the KMM model). The KMMmodel features the recur-
sive structure that is far more tractable in comparison to other models of ambiguity such as
the pioneering maxmin expected utility (or multiple-prior) model of Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989).4 Specifically, the KMM model represents ambiguity by a second-order probability
distribution that captures a decision maker’s uncertainty about which of the subjective
beliefs govern the underlying risk. The KMM model then measures the decision maker’s
expected utility under ambiguity by taking the (second-order) expectation of a concave
transformation of the (first-order) expected utility conditional on each plausible subjective
distribution of the underlying risk. This recursive structure creates a crisp separation be-
tween ambiguity and ambiguity aversion, i.e., between beliefs and tastes, which allows us to
study these two attributes independently. Another nice feature of the KMM model is that
we can apply the conventional techniques in the decision making under uncertainty in the
context of ambiguity (Alary et al., 2013; Broll and Wong, 2015; Cherbonnier and Gollier,
3A vivid description of the Ellsberg’s (1961) paradox is from Keynes (1921). Consider the following
experiment with two urns, K and U. Urn K contains 50 red balls and 50 blue balls. Urn U contains 100 balls
(all balls are either red or blue), but the exact numbers of red and blue balls are not disclosed. Subjects are
asked to select from which urn they would like to draw a ball. They are rewarded if the color of their choice
is drawn. In this experiment, subjects typically select urn K, revealing aversion to ambiguity. To see this,
suppose that subjects believe that the probability of drawing a blue ball from urn U is p. Subjects should
prefer to draw a red ball or a blue ball from urn U than from urn K, depending on whether p is smaller
or greater than 1/2, respectively. If p = 1/2, subjects should be indifferent between the two urns. Since
subjects choose to draw from urn K, such paradoxical behavior can only be rationalized by allowing multiple
priors to be held by subjects on urn U. See also Dillenberger and Segal (2015) and Machina (2014).
4Skiadas (2013) shows that smooth ambiguity preferences can be approximated by preferences admitting
an expected utility representation in continuous-time or high-frequency models under Brownian or Poisson
uncertainty.
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2015; Gollier, 2011; Snow, 2010, 2011; Taboga, 2005; Treich, 2010; Wong, 2015a, 2015b).
In this paper, we incorporate the KMM model into the multinational firm under ex-
change rate uncertainty a` la Broll and Zilcha (1992) by assuming that the multinational
firm possesses smooth ambiguity preferences. Specifically, the multinational firm produces
in the home country and sells its output in both the home and foreign markets. The multi-
national firm is ambiguous about the distribution of the random spot exchange rate between
the home and foreign currencies. To hedge against the exchange rate risk, the multinational
firm can trade the foreign currency forward at a predetermined forward exchange rate. We
show that the separation and full-hedging theorems are robust to the incorporation of am-
biguity and ambiguity preferences. As long as the multinational firm optimally sells the
foreign currency forward, we show that the availability of the currency hedging opportu-
nity induces the multinational firm to produce more and sell less at home, and export more
abroad. When the predetermined forward exchange rate is biased in that it is different from
the objective expected spot exchange rate, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions un-
der which the multinational firm optimally opts for a forward position that is closer to a
full-hedge in response to either the introduction of ambiguity or greater ambiguity aversion.
These necessary and sufficient conditions hold when the multinational firm’s coefficient of
relative risk aversion does not exceed unity and its subjective beliefs are ranked in the sense
of first-order stochastic dominance.5
While most of the results in this paper are consistent with the findings of the extant lit-
erature under risk aversion, subtle differences arise when ambiguity and ambiguity aversion
prevail. First, risk aversion does not allow for ambiguity so that the multinational firm’s
reaction to ambiguity cannot be studied. Second, we show that greater ambiguity aversion
may induce the multinational firm to opt for a forward position that is further away from
a full-hedge when the forward exchange rate is biased, which is in stark contrast to the
case of greater risk aversion. These suggest that the distinction between risk aversion and
5Barham et al. (2014) document that the average coefficient of relative risk aversion is 0.8 in their sample
of Midwestern grain farmers in the U.S., which is in line with the magnitudes of relative risk aversion found
in many developing countries (Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008).
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ambiguity aversion and that between the known-unknown and the unknown-unknown are
important considerations to better understand the behavior of the multinational firm.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 delineates the KMM model of
the multinational firm under exchange rate uncertainty. Section 3 characterizes the solution
to the model. Section 4 examines the effect of currency hedging on the multinational firm’s
production and export decisions. Section 5 examines how ambiguity and ambiguity aversion
affect the multinational firm’s optimal forward position. The final section concludes.
2. The model
Consider the multinational firm under exchange rate uncertainty a` la Broll and Zilcha
(1992) in the context of the KMM model. There is one period with two dates, 0 and
1. To begin, the multinational firm produces a single commodity in the home country
according to a deterministic cost function, C(Q), where Q ≥ 0 is the output level, and
C(Q) is compounded to date 1 with the properties that C(0) = C′(0) = 0, and C′(Q) > 0
and C′′(Q) > 0 for all Q > 0.6 The multinational firm commits to selling Q1 units of its
output at home and exporting Q2 units to a foreign country, where Q1 ≥ 0, Q2 ≥ 0, and
Q1 +Q2 = Q.
The multinational firm’s domestic sales generate home currency revenues at date 1
specified by a deterministic revenue function, R1(Q1). On the other hand, the multinational
firm’s exports generate foreign currency revenues at date 1 specified by another deterministic
revenue function, R2(Q2). We assume that Ri(0) = 0, limQi→0 R
′
i(Qi) =∞, and R
′
i(Qi) > 0
and R′′i (Qi) < 0 for all Qi ≥ 0 and i = 1 and 2. Due to the segmentation of the home
and foreign markets, arbitrage transactions are either impossible or unprofitable, thereby
6The strict convexity of the cost function reflects the fact that the multinational firm’s production tech-
nology exhibits decreasing returns to scale. Our qualitative results remain intact if the multinational firm
can produce the commodity in both the home and foreign countries according to the respective deterministic
cost functions, as in Broll and Zilcha (1992).
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invalidating the law of one price.7
We model the exchange rate uncertainty in a reduced form by a random variable, S˜,
that denotes the unknown spot exchange rate at date 1.8 S˜ is expressed in units of the
home currency per unit of the foreign currency, and is distributed according to an objective
cumulative distribution function (CDF), F ◦(S), over support [S, S], where 0 ≤ S < S ≤ ∞.
To hedge against S˜, the multinational firm can sell (purchase if negative) X units of the
foreign currency forward at the forward exchange rate, Sf , predetermined at date 0, where
S < Sf < S. The multinational firm’s home currency profit at date 1 is, therefore, given
by9
Π˜ = R1(Q1) + S˜R2(Q2) + (S
f − S˜)X − C(Q1 +Q2). (1)
The forward position, X , is said to be an under-hedge, a full-hedge, or an over-hedge,
depending on whether X is smaller than, equal to, or greater than the foreign currency rev-
enue, R2(Q2), respectively. The multinational firm possesses a von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function, U(Π), defined over its home currency profit at date 1, Π, with U ′(Π) > 0
and U ′′(Π) < 0, indicating the presence of risk aversion.
The multinational firm faces ambiguity in that it is uncertain about the objective CDF,
F ◦(S). Succinctly, the multinational firm has a continuum of priors, {F (S|θ) : θ ∈ [θ, θ]},
where F (S|θ) denotes a plausible first-order CDF of S˜ over support [S, S], which is sensitive
to a parameter, θ, whose value is not known ex ante. Based on its subjective information,
the multinational firm associates a second-order CDF, G(θ), over the continuum of priors,
i.e., over support [θ, θ], where −∞ ≤ θ < θ ≤ ∞. This captures the multinational firm’s
uncertainty about which of the first-order CDF, F (S|θ), governs the exchange rate risk, S˜.
Following Gollier (2011), Snow (2010, 2011), and Wong (2015, 2016), we assume that the
7Engel and Rogers (1996, 2001) and Parsley and Wei (1996) provide supportive evidence that arbitrage
transactions among national markets are indeed imperfect.
8Throughout the paper, random variables have a tilde (∼) while their realizations do not.
9It is equally legitimate to interpret the random variable, S˜, as a multiplicative shock to the multinational
firm’s foreign currency revenue, R2(Q2), such as political risk, economic risk, or credit risk, as long as this
risk is either hedgeable or insurable.
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multinational firm’s ambiguous beliefs are unbiased in the sense that the expected exchange
rate risk is equal to the objective exchange rate risk:
∫ θ
θ
F (S|θ)dG(θ) = F ◦(S), (2)
for all S ∈ [S, S].10 We denote EF (·|θ), EG(·), and EF◦(·), as the expectation operators
with respect to the first-order CDF, F (S|θ), the second-order CDF, G(θ), and the objective
CDF, F ◦(S), respectively.
The recursive structure of the KMM model implies that we can compute the multi-
national firm’s expected utility under ambiguity in three steps. First, we calculate the
multinational firm’s expected utility for each first-order CDF of S˜, EF [U(Π˜)|θ], where Π˜ is
given by Eq. (5). Second, we transform each first-order expected utility obtained in the
first sept by an ambiguity function, φ(U), where φ′(U) > 0 and U is the multinational firm’s
utility level. Finally, we take the expectation of the transformed first-order expected utility
obtained in the second step with respect to the second-order CDF of θ˜. The multinational
firm’s ex-ante decision problem as such is given by
max
Q1≥0,Q2≥0,X
∫ θ
θ
φ{EF [U(Π˜)|θ]}dG(θ). (3)
Inspection of the objective function of program (3) reveals that the effect of ambiguity,
represented by the second-order CDF, G(θ), and the effect of ambiguity preferences, rep-
resented by the shape of the ambiguity function, φ(U), can be separated and thus studied
independently.
The multinational firm is said to be ambiguity averse if, for any given triple, (Q1, Q2, X),
the objective function of program (3) decreases when the multinational firm’s ambiguous
beliefs, specified by G(θ), change in a way that induces a mean-preserving spread in the dis-
tribution of the multinational firm’s expected utility. According to this definition, Klibanoff
10The assumption that the expected exchange rate risk is equal to the objective exchange rate risk can be
motivated by the premise that the behavior of an ambiguity-neutral decision maker should be unaffected by
the introduction of, or changes in, ambiguity.
K.P. Wong / International Review of Economics and Finance 8
et al. (2005) show that ambiguity aversion implies concavity for φ(U), and that a concave
transformation of φ(U) results in greater ambiguity aversion.11 To see this, we define the
ambiguity aversion premium, P , as the solution to the following equation:
∫ θ
θ
φ{EF [U(Π˜)|θ]}dG(θ) = φ
{∫ θ
θ
EF [U(Π˜)|θ]dG(θ)− P
}
. (4)
Hence, P measures the “pain” the multinational firm is willing to suffer in order to get rid
of ambiguity. It follows from Eq. (4) and Jensen’s inequality that P > 0 if, and only if,
φ′′(U) < 0. To compare ambiguity aversion, we define the ambiguity aversion premium, Pi,
as the solution to the following equation:
∫ θ
θ
φi{EF [U(Π˜)|θ]}dG(θ) = φi
{∫ θ
θ
EF [U(Π˜)|θ]dG(θ)− Pi
}
, (5)
for i = 1 and 2. It follows from Eq. (5) and Pratt (1964) that P1 < P2 if, and only if,
−φ′′1(U)/φ
′
1(U) < −φ
′′
2(U)/φ
′
2(U), which is equivalent to φ2(U) being a concave transfor-
mation of φ1(U). Throughout the paper, we assume that φ
′′(U) < 0 so that the firm is
ambiguity averse.
3. Solution to the model
The first-order conditions for program (3) are given by
∫ θ
θ
φ′{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ]}EF{U
′(Π˜∗)[R′1(Q
∗
1)−C
′(Q∗1 +Q
∗
2)]|θ}dG(θ) = 0, (6)
∫ θ
θ
φ′{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ]}EF{U
′(Π˜∗)[S˜R′2(Q
∗
2)−C
′(Q∗1 +Q
∗
2)]|θ}dG(θ) = 0, (7)
and
∫ θ
θ
φ′{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ]}EF [U
′(Π˜∗)(Sf − S˜)|θ]dG(θ) = 0, (8)
11When φ(U) = [1−exp(−αU)]/α, Klibanoff et al. (2005) show that the maxmin expected utility model of
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) is the limiting case as the constant absolute ambiguity aversion, α, approaches
infinity under some conditions.
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where Π˜∗ = R1(Q
∗
1) + S˜R2(Q
∗
2) + (S
f − S˜)X∗ − C(Q∗1 +Q
∗
2), Q
∗
1 and Q
∗
2 are the optimal
amounts of domestic sales and foreign exports, respectively, and X∗ is the optimal forward
position. The second-order conditions for program (3) are satisfied given the assumed
properties of φ(U), U(Π), C(Q), and Ri(Qi) for i = 1 and 2.
Since φ′(U) > 0 and U ′(Π) > 0, Eq. (6) reduces to
R′1(Q
∗
1) = C
′(Q∗1 +Q
∗
2). (9)
Multiplying R′2(Q
∗
2) to Eq. (8) and adding the resulting equation to Eq. (7) yields
SfR′2(Q
∗
2) = C
′(Q∗1 +Q
∗
2), (10)
since φ′(U) > 0 and U ′(Π) > 0. Eqs. (9) and (10) imply that the multinational firm’s
optimal production and export decisions depend on the predetermined forward exchange
rate and the cost and revenue functions, but are independent of the degree of ambiguity
and the prevalence of ambiguity preferences.
Suppose that the multinational firm adopts a full-hedge, i.e., X∗ = R2(Q
∗
2). Then, the
left-hand side of Eq. (8) becomes
φ′[U(Π
∗
)]U ′(Π
∗
)
[
Sf −
∫ θ
θ
EF (S˜|θ)dG(θ)
]
= φ′[U(Π
∗
)]U ′(Π
∗
)[Sf − EF◦(S˜)], (11)
where Π
∗
= R1(Q
∗
1) + S
fR2(Q
∗
2) − C(Q
∗
1 + Q
∗
2), and the equality follows from Eq. (2).
Hence, Eqs. (8) and (11) imply that X∗ is less than, equal to, or greater than R2(Q
∗
2),
depending on whether Sf is less than, equal to, or greater than EF◦(S˜), respectively.
We summarize the above results in our first proposition.
Proposition 1. If the ambiguity-averse multinational firm can trade the foreign currency
forward at the predetermined forward exchange rate, Sf , the firm’s optimal amounts of
domestic sales, Q∗1, and foreign exports, Q
∗
2, simultaneously solve Eqs. (9) and (10). The
ambiguity-averse multinational firm’s optimal forward position, X∗, is an under-hedge, a
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full-hedge, or an over-hedge, depending on whether Sf is less than, equal to, or greater than
the objective expected value of S˜, EF◦(S˜), respectively.
The intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows. Since the multinational firm can always sell
the last unit of its foreign currency revenue forward at the predetermined forward exchange
rate, Sf , the usual optimality condition applies in that the marginal cost of production,
C′(Q∗1 +Q
∗
2), must be equated to the known marginal revenue at home, R
′
1(Q
∗
1), and that
in the foreign market, SfR′2(Q
∗
2), which determines the optimal amounts of domestic sales,
Q∗1, and foreign exports, Q
∗
2. If S
f is unbiased in that it is equal to EF◦(S˜), the objective
expected value of S˜, the multinational firm, being risk averse and ambiguity averse, has a
hedging motive to adopt a full-hedge, i.e., X∗ = R2(Q
∗
2), that completely eliminates the
exchange rate risk, S˜, thereby the exposure to ambiguity. On the other hand, if Sf is
less (greater) than EF◦(S˜), the multinational firm has a speculative motive to opt for a
long (short) forward position so as to take advantage of the positive (negative) expected
risk premium, EF◦(S˜) − S
f . Combining the two motives, the multinational firm as such
optimally chooses X∗ to be below (above) R2(Q
∗
2) whenever S
f < (>) EF◦(S˜).
Since φ′′(U) < 0, Jensen’s inequality implies that
∫ θ
θ
φ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ]}dG(θ) ≤ φ
{∫ θ
θ
EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ]dG(θ)
}
, (12)
where, from Proposition 1, the inequality holds with equality only when Sf = EF◦(S˜). In
the absence of ambiguity, the multinational firm knows the objective CDF of S˜ so that
F (S|θ) = F ◦(S) for all S ∈ [S, S] and θ ∈ [θ, θ]. In this case, the results of Proposition 1
remain valid so that the multinational firm’s optimal amounts of domestic sales and foreign
exports are Q∗1 and Q
∗
2, respectively. The multinational firm’s optimal forward position
becomes X◦, which is the solution to the following equation:
EF◦ [U
′(Π˜◦)(Sf − S˜)] = 0, (13)
where Π˜◦ = R1(Q
∗
1) + S˜R2(Q
∗
2) + (S
f − S˜)X◦− C(Q∗1 +Q
∗
2). It follows from Eqs. (8) and
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(13) that X◦ = X∗ = R2(Q
∗
2) if S
f = EF◦(S˜), and X
◦ may or may not be equal to X∗
otherwise.12 Hence, we have
φ{EF◦ [U(Π˜
◦)]} ≥ φ{EF◦ [U(Π˜
∗)]} = φ
{∫ θ
θ
EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ]dG(θ)
}
, (14)
where the equality follows from Eq. (2), and inequality holds with equality if X◦ = X∗.
The following proposition is a direct consequence of Eqs. (12) and (14).
Proposition 2. The presence of ambiguity always makes the ambiguity-averse multina-
tional firm worse off given that the firm can only trade the foreign currency forward at a
biased forward exchange rate, i.e., Sf 6= EF◦(S˜). The ambiguity-averse multinational firm
is indifferent between the presence and the absence of ambiguity given that the firm can
trade the foreign currency forward at the biased forward exchange rate, i.e., Sf = EF◦(S˜).
The intuition for Proposition 2 is as follows. When the forward exchange rate is biased,
i.e., Sf 6= EF◦(S˜), there is a speculative motive that induces the multinational firm not
to completely eliminate the exchange rate risk. The presence of ambiguity as such creates
additional risk that makes the ambiguity-averse multinational firm worse off as compared to
the case without ambiguity. When the forward exchange rate is unbiased, i.e., Sf = EF◦(S˜),
the speculative motive disappears and the multinational firm finds it optimal to completely
eliminate the exchange rate risk, thereby making the presence of ambiguity irrelevant.
4. Firm behavior and currency hedging
In this section, we examine the effect of currency hedging on the multinational firm’s
production and export decisions. To this end, we examine a benchmark case wherein the
multinational firm is banned from trading the foreign currency forward so that X ≡ 0.
12See Proposition 3 in Section 4 for an explicit comparison between X◦ and X∗ when Sf 6= EF◦(S˜).
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In this case, the multinational firm’s optimal amounts of domestic sales, Qn1 , and foreign
exports, Qn2 , solve the following first-order conditions:
∫ θ
θ
φ′{EF [U(Π˜
n)|θ]}EF{U
′(Π˜n)[R′1(Q
n
1 )− C
′(Qn1 +Q
n
2 )]|θ}dG(θ) = 0, (15)
and
∫ θ
θ
φ′{EF [U(Π˜
n)|θ]}EF{U
′(Π˜n)[S˜R′2(Q
n
2 )−C
′(Qn1 +Q
n
2 )]|θ}dG(θ) = 0, (16)
where Π˜n = R1(Q
n
1 ) + S˜R2(Q
n
2 )−C(Q
n
1 +Q
n
2 ).
We compare the multinational firm’s optimal production and export decisions with and
without the currency hedging opportunity in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. If the following condition holds:
∫ θ
θ
φ′{EF [U(Π˜
n)|θ]}EF [U
′(Π˜n)(Sf − S˜)|θ]dG(θ) > 0, (17)
allowing the ambiguity-averse multinational firm to trade the foreign currency forward at
the predetermined forward exchange rate, Sf , results in a decrease in the optimal amount
of domestic sales, i.e., Q∗1 < Q
◦
1, an increase in the optimal amount of foreign exports, i.e.,
Q∗2 > Q
◦
2, and an increase in the optimal output level, i.e., Q
∗
1 +Q
∗
2 > Q
◦
1 +Q
◦
2.
Proof. Since φ′(U) > 0 and U ′(Π) > 0, Eq. (15) reduces to
R′1(Q
n
1 ) = C
′(Qn1 +Q
n
2 ). (18)
Recast Eq. (16) as
SfR′2(Q
n
2 )−C
′(Qn1 +Q
n
2 )
=
∫ θ
θ φ
′{EF [U(Π˜
n)|θ]}EF [U
′(Π˜n)(Sf − S˜)|θ]dG(θ)R′2(Q
n
2 )∫ θ
θ φ
′{EF [U(Π˜n)|θ]}EF [U ′(Π˜n)|θ]dG(θ)
. (19)
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It then follows from condition (17) and Eq. (19) that SfR′2(Q
n
2 ) > C
′(Qn1 +Q
n
2 ).
Suppose that Qn2 ≥ Q
∗
2 so that S
fR′2(Q
n
2 ) ≤ S
fR′2(Q
∗
2). Since S
fR′2(Q
n
2 ) > C
′(Qn1+Q
n
2 )
and SfR′2(Q
∗
2) = C
′(Q∗1+Q
∗
2), we have C
′(Qn1+Q
n
2 ) < C
′(Q∗1+Q
∗
2), implying thatQ
n
1+Q
n
2 <
Q∗1 +Q
∗
2. It then follows from Eqs. (9) and (18) that R
′
1(Q
n
1 ) < R
′
1(Q
∗
1) so that Q
n
1 > Q
∗
1.
But we have Qn2 ≥ Q
∗
2 so that Q
n
1 +Q
n
2 > Q
∗
1+Q
∗
2, a contradiction. Hence, it must be true
that Qn2 < Q
∗
2.
Suppose now that Qn1 ≤ Q
∗
1 so that R
′
1(Q
n
1 ) ≥ R
′
1(Q
∗
1). It then follows from Eqs. (9) and
(18) that Qn1 +Q
n
2 ≥ Q
∗
1+Q
∗
2. From above, we have Q
n
2 < Q
∗
2 so that Q
n
1 +Q
n
2 < Q
∗
1+Q
∗
2,
a contradiction. Hence, it must be true that Qn1 > Q
∗
1.
From above, we have Qn1 > Q
∗
1 so that R
′
1(Q
n
1 ) < R
′
1(Q
∗
1). It then follows from Eqs. (9)
and (18) that Qn1 +Q
n
2 < Q
∗
1 +Q
∗
2. 2
To see the meaning of condition (17), we define Q1(X) and Q2(X) as the solution to
program (3) for a fixed forward position, X . When X = 0, we have Q1(0) = Q
n
1 and
Q2(0) = Q
n
2 . When X = X
∗, we have Q1(X
∗) = Q∗1 and Q2(X
∗) = Q∗2. Substituting
Q1 = Q1(X) and Q2 = Q2(X) into the objective function of program (3), we differentiate
the objective function with respect to X , and evaluate the resulting derivative at X = 0 to
yield
∂
∂X
∫ θ
θ
φ{EF [U(Π˜)|θ]}dG(θ)
∣∣∣∣
Q1=Q1(X),Q2=Q2(X),X=0
=
∫ θ
θ
φ′{EF [U(Π˜
n)|θ]}EF [U
′(Π˜n)(Sf − S˜)|θ]dG(θ), (20)
where we have used the envelop theorem and the fact that Q1(0) = Q
n
1 and Q2(0) = Q
n
2 .
If X∗ > 0, it follows from Eq. (8) that the right-hand side of Eq. (20) must be positive,
and thus condition (17) holds. We can interpret the right-hand side of Eq. (19) as the
certainty equivalent risk premium that takes the multinational firm’s smooth ambiguity
preferences into account. Condition (17) ensures that this risk premium is positive so that
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the multinational firm has incentives to sell the foreign currency forward, i.e.,X∗ > 0, at the
predetermined forward exchange rate, Sf . From Proposition 1, we have X∗ ≥ R2(Q
∗
2) > 0
whenever Sf ≥ EF◦(S˜). Hence, as long as S
f is not too small compared to EF◦(S˜), it must
be true that X∗ > 0. In this case, the multinational firm optimally sells the foreign currency
forward and thus its exchange rate risk exposure is reduced. As such, the multinational
firm is willing to increase its optimal output level, i.e., Q∗1+Q
∗
2 > Q
n
1 +Q
n
2 , and to raise its
optimal amount of foreign exports, i.e., Q∗2 > Q
n
2 , at the expense of a reduction of domestic
sales, i.e., Q∗1 < Q
n
1 .
If condition (17) is violated in that
∫ θ
θ
φ′{EF [U(Π˜
n)|θ]}EF [U
′(Π˜n)(Sf − S˜)|θ]dG(θ) < 0, (21)
it follows from Eq. (20) that X∗ < 0. Given condition (21), one can analogously show that
the multinational firm optimally sells more at home, i.e.,Q∗1 > Q
n
1 , exports less to the foreign
country, i.e., Q∗2 < Q
n
2 , and produces less in the home country, i.e., Q
∗
1+Q
∗
2 < Q
n
1 +Q
n
2 , if it
is allowed to trade the foreign currency forward at the predetermined forward exchange rate,
Sf . This case, however, is of less interest because it would imply that the multinational firm
buys the foreign currency forward to augment (not reduce) its exchange rate risk exposure.
5. Ambiguity and currency hedging
From Proposition 1, we know that the separation and full-hedging theorems hold irre-
spective of whether ambiguity is present or not. Hence, to examine the effect of ambiguity
on the multinational firm’s behavior, we compare the multinational firm’s optimal forward
position in the presence of ambiguity, X∗, to that in the absence of ambiguity, X◦, when
the predetermined forward exchange rate, Sf , is biased, i.e., Sf 6= EF◦(S˜).
Substituting Q1 = Q
∗
1 and Q2 = Q
∗
2 into the objective function of program (3), we
differentiate the objective function with respect to X and evaluate the resulting derivative
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at X = X◦ to yield
∂
∂X
∫ θ
θ
φ{EF [U(Π˜)|θ]}dG(θ)
∣∣∣∣
Q1=Q
∗
1
,Q2=Q
∗
2
,X=X◦
=
∫ θ
θ
φ′{EF [U(Π˜
◦)|θ]}EF [U
′(Π˜◦)(Sf − S˜)|θ]dG(θ)
=
∫ θ
θ
φ′{EF [U(Π˜
◦)|θ]}dG(θ)EF◦[U
′(Π˜◦)(Sf − S˜)]
+CovG
{
φ′{EF [U(Π˜
◦)|θ˜]},EF [U
′(Π˜◦)(Sf − S˜)|θ˜]
}
= CovG
{
φ′{EF [U(Π˜
◦)|θ˜]},EF [U
′(Π˜◦)(Sf − S˜)|θ˜]
}
, (22)
where Π˜◦ = R1(Q
∗
1) + S˜R2(Q
∗
2) + (S
f − S˜)X◦−C(Q∗1+Q
∗
2), the first equality follows from
Eq. (2), the second equality follows from Eq. (13), and CovG(·, ·) is the covariance operator
with respect to the second-order CDF, G(θ). When Sf < EF◦(S˜), it follows from Eq. (8)
and Proposition 1 that X◦ < X∗ < R2(Q
∗
2) if, and only if, the covariance term on the
right-hand side of Eq. (22) is positive. On the other hand, when Sf > EF◦(S˜), it follows
from Eq. (8) and Proposition 1 that X◦ > X∗ > R2(Q
∗
2) if, and only if, the covariance
term on the right-hand side of Eq. (22) is negative. We as such establish the following
proposition.
Proposition 4. When the predetermined forward exchange rate, Sf , is smaller (greater)
than the objective expected value of S˜, EF◦(S˜), introducing ambiguity to the ambiguity-averse
multinational firm renders the optimal forward position, X∗, to be closer to a full-hedge if,
and only if, the covariance between φ′{EF [U(Π˜
◦)|θ˜]} and EF [U
′(Π˜◦)(Sf − S˜)|θ˜] is positive
(negative).
To see the intuition for Proposition 4, we write Eq. (13) as
Sf = EF◦(S˜) +
CovF◦ [U
′(Π˜◦), S˜]
EF◦ [U ′(Π˜◦)]
, (23)
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where CovF◦(·, ·) is the covariance operator with respect to the objective CDF, F
◦(S).
Eq. (23) states that the multinational firm’s optimal forward position, X◦, is the one that
equates the predetermined forward exchange rate to the certainty equivalent spot exchange
rate at date 1. We can interpret the second term on the right-hand side of Eq. (23) as the
risk premium demanded by the multinational firm to compensate for its exposure to the
exchange rate risk. Using Eq. (2), we can write Eq. (22) as
∂
∂X
∫ θ
θ
φ{EF [U(Π˜)|θ]}dG(θ)
∣∣∣∣
Q1=Q∗1,Q2=Q
∗
2
,X=X◦
= EG
{
φ′{EF [U(Π˜
◦)|θ˜]}
}
EF◦ [U
′(Π˜◦)]
{
Sf − EF◦(S˜)−
CovF◦ [U
′(Π˜◦), S˜]
EF◦ [U ′(Π˜◦)]
+
CovG{φ
′{EF [U(Π˜
◦)|θ˜]},EF [U
′(Π˜◦)(Sf − S˜)|θ˜]}
EG{φ′{EF [U(Π˜◦)|θ˜]}}EF◦[U ′(Π˜◦)]
}
. (24)
We can interpret the last term inside the curly brackets on the right-hand side of Eq.
(24) as the ambiguity premium demanded by the multinational firm to compensate for its
exposure to ambiguity at X = X◦. Given that the covariance between φ′{EF [U(Π˜
◦)|θ˜]} and
EF [U
′(Π˜◦)(Sf − S˜)|θ˜] is positive (negative), the ambiguity premium is positive (negative)
so that the certainty equivalent spot exchange rate at date 1 is smaller (greater) than the
predetermined forward exchange rate at X = X◦. To restore the optimality condition, the
multinational firm is induced to sell more (less) than X◦ in response to the introduction of
ambiguity. Hence, we have X◦ < X∗ < R2(Q
∗
2) when S
f < EF◦(S˜) and X
◦ > X∗ > R2(Q
∗
2)
when Sf > EF◦(S˜).
To show that the necessary and sufficient conditions as stated in Proposition 4 hold
under reasonable scenarios, we focus on the case wherein the multinational firm’s coefficient
of relative risk aversion, Φ(Π) = −ΠU ′′(Π)/U ′(Π), does not exceed unity for all Π > 0, and
the parameter, θ, ranks the first-order CDF, F (S|θ), in the sense of first-order stochastic
dominance. Using integration by parts, we differentiate φ′{EF [U(Π˜
◦)|θ]} with respect to θ
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to yield
∂
∂θ
φ′{EF [U(Π˜
◦)|θ]} =
∫ S
S
φ′′{EF [U(Π˜
◦)|θ]}U ′(Π◦)[X◦− R2(Q
∗
2)]Fθ(S|θ)dS, (25)
where Fθ(S|θ) = ∂F (S|θ)/∂θ. When S
f < (>) EF◦(S˜), we have X
◦ < (>) R2(Q
∗
2) from
Proposition 1. It then follows from Eq. (25) that ∂φ′{EF [U(Π˜
◦)|θ]}/∂θ has the same sign
as (opposite sign to) that of Fθ(S|θ) when S
f < (>) EF◦(S˜). Likewise, using integration
by parts, we differentiate EF [U
′(Π˜◦)(Sf − S˜)|θ] with respect to θ to yield
∂
∂θ
EF [U
′(Π˜◦)(Sf − S˜)|θ] =
∫ S
S
{U ′(Π◦)[1− Φ(Π◦)]− U ′′(Π◦)Π
∗
}Fθ(S|θ) dS, (26)
where Π
∗
= R1(Q
∗
1) + S
fR2(Q
∗
2) − C(Q
∗
1 + Q
∗
2). Since Φ(Π) ≤ 1 for all Π > 0, Eq. (26)
implies that ∂EF [U
′(Π˜◦)(Sf − S˜)|θ]/∂θ has the same sign as that of Fθ(S|θ). Hence, the
covariance between φ′{EF [U(Π˜
◦)|θ˜]} and EF [U
′(Π˜◦)(Sf− S˜)|θ˜] is indeed positive (negative)
when Sf < (>) EF◦(S˜).
Klibanoff et al. (2005) show that the multinational firm becomes more ambiguity averse
when φ(U) is replaced by K[φ(U)] in the objective function of program (3), where K(·)
satisfies that K ′(·) > 0 and K ′′(·) < 0. The more ambiguity-averse multinational firm’s
ex-ante decision problem is given by
max
Q1≥0,Q2≥0,X
∫ θ
θ
K
{
φ{EF [U(Π˜)|θ]}
}
dG(θ). (27)
From Proposition 1, we know that the separation and full-hedging theorems hold irrespective
of the multinational firm’s ambiguity aversion. The multinational firm’s optimal forward
position becomes X, which is the solution to the following equation:
∫ θ
θ
K ′
{
φ{EF [U(Π˜
)|θ]}
}
φ′{EF [U(Π˜
)|θ]}EF [U
′(Π˜)(Sf − S˜)|θ˜]dG(θ) = 0, (28)
where Π˜ = R1(Q
∗
1)+ S˜R2(Q
∗
2)+(S
f− S˜)X−C(Q∗1+Q
∗
2). Hence, to examine the effect of
greater ambiguity aversion on the multinational firm’s optimal forward position, we compare
X to X∗ when the predetermined forward exchange rate, Sf , is biased, i.e., Sf 6= EF◦(S˜).
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Substituting Q1 = Q
∗
1 and Q2 = Q
∗
2 into the objective function of program (27), we
differentiate the objective function with respect to X and evaluate the resulting derivative
at X = X∗ to yield
∂
∂X
∫ θ
θ
K
{
φ{EF [U(Π˜)|θ]}
}
dG(θ)
∣∣∣∣
Q1=Q∗1,Q2=Q
∗
2
,X=X∗
=
∫ θ
θ
K ′
{
φ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ]}
}
φ′{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ]}EF [U
′(Π˜∗)(Sf − S˜)|θ˜]dG(θ)
=
∫ θ
θ
K ′
{
φ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ]}
}
dG(θ)
∫ θ
θ
φ′{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ]}EF [U
′(Π˜∗)(Sf − S˜)|θ˜]dG(θ)
+CovG
{
K ′
{
φ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}
}
, φ′{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}EF [U
′(Π˜∗)(Sf − S˜)|θ˜]
}
= CovG
{
K ′
{
φ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}
}
, φ′{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}EF [U
′(Π˜∗)(Sf − S˜)|θ˜]
}
, (29)
where Π˜∗ = R1(Q
∗
1) + S˜R2(Q
∗
2) + (S
f − S˜)X∗ − C(Q∗1 + Q
∗
2), the second equality follows
from Eq. (8). When Sf < EF◦(S˜), it follows from Eq. (28) and Proposition 1 that
X∗ < X < R2(Q
∗
2) if, and only if, the covariance term on the right-hand side of Eq. (29) is
positive. On the other hand, when Sf > EF◦(S˜), it follows from Eq. (28) and Proposition
1 that X∗ > X > R2(Q
∗
2) if, and only if, the covariance term on the right-hand side of Eq.
(29) is negative. We as such establish the following proposition.
Proposition 5. When the predetermined forward exchange rate, Sf , is smaller (greater)
than the objective expected value of S˜, EF◦(S˜), making the ambiguity-averse exporting firm
more ambiguity averse by replacing φ(U) by K[φ(U)] renders the optimal forward position,
X, to be closer to a full-hedge if, and only if, the covariance between K ′{φ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}}
and φ′{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}EF [U
′(Π˜∗)(Sf − S˜)|θ˜] is positive (negative).
To see the intuition for Proposition 5, we write Eq. (8) as
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Sf = EF◦(S˜) +
CovF◦ [U
′(Π˜∗), S˜]
EF◦ [U ′(Π˜∗)]
−
CovG{φ
′{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]},EF [U
′(Π˜∗)(Sf − S˜)|θ˜]}
EG{φ′{EF [U(Π˜∗)|θ˜]}}EF◦[U ′(Π˜∗)]
. (30)
Eq. (30) states that the multinational firm’s optimal forward position, X∗, is the one that
equates the predetermined forward exchange rate to the certainty equivalent spot exchange
rate at date 1. Using Eq. (2), we can write Eq. (29) as
∂
∂X
∫ θ
θ
K
{
φ{EF [U(Π˜)|θ]}
}
dG(θ)
∣∣∣∣
Q1=Q
∗
1
,Q2=Q
∗
2
,X=X∗
= EG
{
K ′
{
φ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}
}}
EG
{
φ′{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}
}
EF◦ [U
′(Π˜∗)]
{
Sf − EF◦(S˜)
−
CovF◦ [U
′(Π˜∗), S˜]
EF◦ [U ′(Π˜∗)]
+
CovG{φ
′{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]},EF [U
′(Π˜∗)(Sf − S˜)|θ˜]}
EG{φ′{EF [U(Π˜∗)|θ˜]}}EF◦ [U ′(Π˜∗)]
+
CovG{K
′{φ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}}, φ′{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}EF [U
′(Π˜∗)(Sf − S˜)|θ˜]}
EG{K ′{φ{EF [U(Π˜∗)|θ˜]}}}EG{φ′{EF [U(Π˜∗)|θ˜]}}EF◦ [U ′(Π˜∗)]
}
. (31)
We can interpret the last term inside the curly brackets on the right-hand side of Eq. (31)
as the additional ambiguity premium demanded by the multinational firm to compensate
for its exposure to ambiguity at X = X∗ due to greater ambiguity aversion. Given that
the covariance between K ′{φ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}} and φ′{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}EF [U
′(Π˜∗)(Sf − S˜)|θ˜]}
is positive (negative), the additional ambiguity premium is positive (negative) so that the
certainty equivalent spot exchange rate at date 1 is smaller (greater) than the predetermined
forward exchange rate at X = X∗. To restore the optimality condition, the multinational
firm is induced to sell more (less) than X∗ in response to greater ambiguity aversion. Hence,
we have X∗ < X < R2(Q
∗
2) when S
f < EF◦(S˜) and X
∗ > X > R2(Q
∗
2) when S
f >
EF◦(S˜).
To show that the necessary and sufficient conditions as stated in Proposition 5 hold
under reasonable scenarios, we focus on the case wherein the multinational firm’s coefficient
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of relative risk aversion, Φ(Π) = −ΠU ′′(Π)/U ′(Π), does not exceed unity for all Π > 0, and
an increase in the parameter, θ, always deteriorates the first-order CDF, F (S|θ), in the
sense of first-order stochastic dominance, i.e., Fθ(S|θ) ≥ 0 for all S ∈ [S, S] and θ ∈ [θ, θ].
13
Using integration by parts, we differentiate K ′{ϕ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ]}} with respect to θ to yield
∂
∂θ
K ′
{
ϕ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ]}
}
= K ′′
{
ϕ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ]}
}
ϕ′{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ]}
∫ S
S
U ′(Π∗)[X∗− R2(Q
∗
2)]Fθ(S|θ)dS. (32)
When Sf < (>) EF◦(S˜), we have X
∗ < (>) R2(Q
∗
2) from Proposition 1. Since Fθ(S|θ) ≥ 0
for all S ∈ [S, S] and θ ∈ [θ, θ], Eq. (32) implies that ∂K ′{ϕ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ]}}/∂θ > (<) 0
when Sf < (>) EF◦(S˜). Using integration by parts, we differentiate EF{U
′(Π˜∗)(Sf − S˜)|θ}
with respect to θ to yield
∂
∂θ
EF{U
′(Π˜∗)(Sf − S˜)|θ} =
∫ S
S
{U ′(Π∗)[1−Φ(Π∗)]− U ′′(Π∗)Π
∗
}Fθ(S|θ) dS, (33)
where Π
∗
= R1(Q
∗
1)+S
fR2(Q
∗
2)−C(Q
∗
1+Q
∗
2). Since Φ(Π) ≤ 1 for all Π > 0 and Fθ(S|θ) ≥ 0
for all S ∈ [S, S] and θ ∈ [θ, θ], Eq. (33) implies that ∂EF [U
′(Π˜∗)(Sf−S˜)|θ]/∂θ > 0. Hence,
there must exist a unique point, θ1 ∈ (θ, θ) such that EF [U
′(Π˜∗)(Sf − S˜)|θ] < (>) 0 for all
θ < (>) θ1. Using Eq. (8), we can write the right-hand side of Eq. (29) as
∫ θ
θ
{
K ′
{
φ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ]}
}
−K ′
{
φ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ1]}
}}
×φ′{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ]}EF [U
′(Π˜∗)(Sf − S˜)|θ]dG(θ). (34)
When Sf < (>) EF◦(S˜), we have ∂K
′{φ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ]}}/∂θ > (<) 0 so that Eq. (34)
must be positive (negative). It then follows from Eq. (29) that the covariance between
K ′{φ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}} and φ′{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}EF [U
′(Π˜∗)(Sf − S˜)|θ˜} is indeed positive (nega-
tive) when Sf < (>) EF◦(S˜).
13The case wherein an increase in θ always improves the first-order CDF, F (S|θ), in the sense of first-order
stochastic dominance gives the same result.
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Before leaving this section, it is worth pointing out the difference between the impact of
risk aversion and that of ambiguity aversion. If the multinational firm is purely risk averse,
it is well-known that greater risk aversion always induces the multinational firm to adopt
a forward position that is closer to a full-hedge (Holthausen, 1979) given that the forward
exchange rate is biased. However, this result holds under ambiguity aversion if, and only if,
the necessary and sufficient conditions stated in Proposition 5 are satisfied. As shown above,
if the multinational firm’s coefficient of relative risk aversion, Φ(Π) = −ΠU ′′(Π)/U ′(Π), far
exceeds unity, the necessary and sufficient conditions stated in Proposition 5 would be
violated. In this case, greater ambiguity aversion would then induce the multinational firm
to opt for a forward position that is further away from a full-hedge given that the forward
exchange rate is biased.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the production and hedging decisions of the multinational
firm under exchange rate uncertainty a` la Broll and Zilcha (1992). The multinational firm
produces in the home country and sells its output in both the home and foreign markets. To
hedge against the exchange rate risk, the multinational firm can trade the foreign currency
forward at a predetermined forward exchange rate. The multinational firm’s preferences
exhibit smooth ambiguity aversion developed by Klibanoff et al. (2005). Ambiguity is
represented by a second-order probability distribution that captures the multinational firm’s
uncertainty about which of the subjective beliefs govern the exchange rate risk. On the other
hand, ambiguity preferences are modeled by the (second-order) expectation of a concave
transformation of the (first-order) expected utility of home currency profit conditional on
each plausible subjective distribution of the exchange rate risk.
We show that the separation and full-hedging theorems are robust to the prevalence
of ambiguity and ambiguity preferences. The multinational firm optimally produces more
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and sells less at home, and exports more abroad in the presence than in the absence of the
currency hedging opportunity. Given that the forward exchange rate is biased, we derive
necessary and sufficient conditions under which the multinational firm optimally opts for
a forward position that is closer to a full-hedge in response to either the introduction of
ambiguity or greater ambiguity aversion. These necessary and sufficient conditions are
satisfied when the multinational firm’s coefficient of relative risk aversion does not exceed
unity and its subjective beliefs are ranked in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance.
In this paper, we model the exchange rate risk in a reduced form by assuming that
the multinational firm commits to its export decision made prior to the resolution of the
exchange rate uncertainty. This specification ignores the fact that the exchange rate risk
is likely to be linked to factors such as economic growth, inflation, interest rates, and
employment that also drive the profitability of the multinational firm in reality. Taking
these factors into account requires a general equilibrium approach, which is an interesting
and important extension. Another plausible extension is to expose the multinational firm
to other sources of uncertainty such as political (and regulatory) risk, economic risk, and
credit risk. Indeed, not much has been done for the decision making under multiple sources
of ambiguity (Wong, 2016a, 2016b). We leave these challenges for future research.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Udo Broll, Carl Chen (the editor), and an anonymous referee for
their helpful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
References
Alary, D., Gollier, C., & Treich, N. (2013). The effect of ambiguity aversion on insurance
and self-protection. Economic Journal, 123, 1188–1202.
K.P. Wong / International Review of Economics and Finance 23
Barham, B. L., Chavas, J.-P., Fitz, D., Salas, V. R., & Schechter, L. (2014). The role
of risk and ambiguity in technology adoption. Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization, 97, 204–218.
Bodnar, G. M., Hayt, G. S., & Marston, R. C. (1998). 1998 Wharton survey of financial
risk management by US non-financial firms. Financial Management, 27, 70–91.
Broll, U. (1992). The effect of forward markets on multinational firms. Bulletin of Economic
Research, 44, 233–240.
Broll, U., & Wong, K. P. (2015). The incentive to trade under ambiguity aversion. Journal
of Economic Asymmetries, 12, 190–196.
Broll, U., & Zilcha, I. (1992). Exchange rate uncertainty, futures markets and the multina-
tional firm. European Economic Review, 36, 815–826.
Cardenas, J. C., & Carpenter, J. (2008). Behavioural development economics: Lessons from
field labs in the developing world. Journal of Development Studies, 44, 311–338.
Cherbonnier, F., & Gollier, C. (2015). Decreasing aversion under ambiguity. Journal of
Economic Theory, 157, 606–623.
Chesson, H. W., & Viscusi, W. K. (2003). Commonalities in time and ambiguity aversion
for long-term risks. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 24, 57–71.
Choe, C., Lien, D., & Yu, C.-F. (2015). Optimal managerial hedging and contracting with
self-esteem concerns. International Review of Economics and Finance, 37, 354–367.
Chow, C. C., & Sarin, R. K. (2001). Comparative ignorance and the Ellsberg Paradox.
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 22, 129–139.
Dillenberger, D., & Segal, U. (2015). Recursive ambiguity and Machina’s examples. Inter-
national Economic Review, 56, 55–61.
Einhorn, H. J., & Hogarth, R. M. (1986). Decision making under ambiguity. Journal of
Business, 59, S225–S250.
K.P. Wong / International Review of Economics and Finance 24
Ellsberg, D. (1961). Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage axioms. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 75, 643–669.
Engel, C., & Rogers, J. H. (1996). How wide is the border? American Economic Review,
86, 1112–1125.
Engel, C., & Rogers, J. H. (2001). Violating the law of one price: should we make a Federal
case out of it? Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 33, 1–15.
Gilboa, I., & Schmeidler, D. (1989). Maxmin expected utility with a non-unique prior.
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18, 141–153.
Gollier, C. (2011). Portfolio choices and asset prices: the comparative statics of ambiguity
aversion. Review of Economic Studies, 78, 1329–1344.
Holthausen, D. M. (1979). Hedging and the competitive firm under price uncertainty.
American Economic Review, 69, 989–995.
Jesswein, K. R., Kwok, C. C. Y., & Folk, W. R. (1995). Corporate use of innovative foreign
exchange risk management products. Columbia Journal of World Business, 30, 70–82.
Katz, E., & Paroush, J. (1979). The effect of forwardmarkets on exporting firms. Economics
Letters, 4, 272–274.
Kawai, M., & Zilcha, I. (1986). International trade with forward-futures markets under
exchange rate and price uncertainty. Journal of International Economics, 20, 83–98.
Keynes, J. M. (1921). A treatise on probability. London: Macmillan.
Klibanoff, P., Marinacci, M., & Mukerji, S. (2005). A smooth model of decision making
under ambiguity. Econometrica, 73, 1849–1892.
Knight, F. H. (1921). Risk, uncertainty and profit. Boston: Houghton Miﬄin.
Lien, D., & Wong, K. P. (2005). Multinationals and futures hedging under liquidity con-
straints. Global Finance Journal, 16, 210–220.
K.P. Wong / International Review of Economics and Finance 25
Machina, M. J. (2014). Ambiguity aversion with three or more outcomes. American Eco-
nomic Review, 104, 3814–3840.
Meng, R., & Wong, K. P. (2007). Currency hedging for multinationals under liquidity
constraints. Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 17, 417–431.
Parsley, D. C., & Wei, S. J. (1996). Convergence to the law of one price without trade
barriers or currency fluctuations. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111, 1211–1236.
Pratt, J. W. (1964). Risk aversion in the small and in the large. Econometrica, 32, 122–136.
Sarin, R. K., &Weber, M. (1993). Effects of ambiguity in market experiments. Management
Science, 39, 602–615.
Skiadas, C. (2013). Smooth ambiguity aversion toward small risks and continuous-time
recursive utility. Journal of Political Economy, 121, 775–792.
Snow, A. (2010). Ambiguity and the value of information. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,
40, 133–145.
Snow, A. (2011). Ambiguity aversion and the propensities for self-insurance and self-
protection. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 42, 27–43.
Taboga, M. (2005). Portfolio selection with two-stage preferences. Finance Research Let-
ters, 2, 152–164.
Treich, N. (2010). The value of a statistical life under ambiguity aversion. Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management, 59, 15–26.
Viaene, J.-M., & Zilcha, I. (1998). The behavior of competitive exporting firms under
multiple uncertainty. International Economic Review, 39, 591–609.
Viscusi, W. K., & Chesson, H. W. (1999). Hopes and fears: the conflicting effects of risk
ambiguity. Theory and Decision, 47, 153–178.
Wong, K. P. (2012). Production and futures hedging with state-dependent background risk.
International Review of Economics and Finance, 24, 177–184.
K.P. Wong / International Review of Economics and Finance 26
Wong, K. P. (2013). International trade and hedging under joint price and exchange rate
uncertainty. International Review of Economics and Finance, 27, 160–170.
Wong, K. P. (2015a). Ambiguity and the value of hedging. Journal of Futures Markets, 35,
839–848.
Wong, K. P. (2015b). A smooth ambiguity model of the competitive firm. Bulletin of
Economic Research, 67, S97–S110.
Wong, K. P. (2016a). Production and hedging under smooth ambiguity preferences. Journal
of Futures Markets, 36, 506–518.
Wong, K. P. (2016b). Cross-hedging ambiguous exchange rate risk. Journal of Futures
Markets, 36, in press.
